Some blunt instruments of dogmatic logic: Sextus Empiricus’s sceptical attack by Spinelli, Emidio
Emidio Spinelli
Some Blunt Instruments of Dogmatic Logic:
Sextus Empiricus’ Sceptical Attack
1 The Feeble Power of Dogmatic Logic
Even without delving into the abundant historiographical and doxographical details
to be found in the treatment offered by Sextus Empiricus in the parallel passages of
his Against the Mathematicians (Adversus Mathematicos = M VII and VIII), it must be
acknowledged that the more succinct and introductory analysis he presents in the
second book of his Outlines of Pyrrhonism (= PH) may already satisfy the reader wish-
ing to investigate questions of truth and falsehood, in relation to both dogmatic phi-
losophies and the objections raised by the sceptics.
The underlying argument of Sextus’ book systematically addresses a series of
topics familiar to anyone seeking to establish the truth of those key epistemological
tools exploited by currents of thought purporting to state ‘how things really stand’:
an easy target for Pyrrhonian criticism.
Following a few introductory sections (PH II 1– 12) of crucial importance for un-
derstanding—and especially justifying, against all sterile dogmatist polemics—a gen-
uine form of sceptical zetein,¹ Sextus examines (and attempts to demolish) some cen-
tral concepts in dogmatic ‘logic.’ The semantic field covered by ‘logic’ here is far
broader than the one usually attributed to it, insofar as it extends to questions
that may be seen to fall under the labels of epistemology, semiotics, the philosophy
of language, and so on.
From first to last, Sextus pays special attention to the following notions:
 See therefore: Jacques Brunschwig, “Sextus Empiricus on the κριτήριον,” in idem, Papers in Hel-
lenistic Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994): 224–241; Emidio Spinelli, Questio-
ni scettiche. Letture introduttive al pirronismo antico (Rome: Lithos, 2005): 114– 117 (now also online:
http://scholarlysource.daphnet.org/index.php/DDL/issue/view/18); Katja M. Vogt, “Skeptische Suche
und das Verstehen von Begriffen,” in Wissen und Bildung in der antiken Philosophie, eds. Christoph
Rapp and Tim Wagner (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2006): 325–339; Filip Grgić, “Sextus Empiricus on
the Possibility of Inquiry,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2008): 436–459; Lorenzo Corti, Scepti-
cisme et langage (Paris: Vrin, 2009): 185–206; Gail Fine, “Sceptical Inquiry,” in Definition in Ancient
Philosophy, ed. David Charles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 493–525; eadem, “Concepts
and Inquiry: Sextus and the Epicureans,” in Episteme, etc. Essays in Honour of Jonathan Barnes,
eds. Ben Morison and Katherina Ierodiakonou (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 90–114 [=
now eadem, The Possibility of Inquiry: Meno’s Paradox from Socrates to Sextus (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2014): chs. 10 and 11]; and Anna Tigani, “A New Answer to an Old Puzzle: Nοεῖν ἁπλῶς
(Sextus Empiricus, PH II 1.10),” Logical Analysis & History of Philosophy/Philosophiegeschichte und
Logische Analyse 19 (2016): 188–211.
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– criterion (PH II 14–79; cf. M VII 25–37 and 46–445);²
– the true and truth (PH II 80–96; cf. M VII 38–45; VIII 1– 140);³
– sign (PH II 97–133; cf. M VIII 141–299);⁴
– demonstration (PH II 134– 192; cf. M VIII 300–481);⁵
– syllogism (PH II 193–203);
– induction and definition (PH II 204 and 205–212);⁶
– division, whole/parts, genus/species, and accidents (PH II 213–228), examined
in this contribution;
– sophisms (PH II 229–259).⁷
Within this conceptually homogeneous logical-epistemological arsenal that reflects a
perspective marked by the dichotomy of true/false, I would like to focus on one of
the ‘logical’ sections. These are unique in Sextus’ work and hence find no parallels
in the more meticulous analysis provided inM VII and VIII. This uniqueness does not
merely concern the dogmatic theories pertaining to the notions of syllogism, induc-
tion/definition, and sophism, but extends to a range of points made with regard to
logical-demonstrative argumentation, and which appear to play a leading role in the
doctrines that Sextus seeks to refute.
 See, Anthony A. Long, “Sextus Empiricus on the Criterion of Truth,” Bulletin of the Institute of Clas-
sical Studies 25 (1978): 35–49; Jacques Brunschwig, “Sextus Empiricus on the kriterion: the Sceptic as
Conceptual Legatee,” in The Question of ‘Eclecticism’: Studies in Later Greek Philosophy, eds. John M.
Dillon and Anthony A. Long (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988): 145– 175; Tad Brennan,
“Criterion and Appearance in Sextus Empiricus,” in Ancient Scepticism and the Sceptical Tradition,
ed. Juha Sihvola (Helsinki: Hakapaino O., 2000): 63–92; and Rosario La Sala, “Argumentative Strat-
egien bei Sextus Empiricus. Das Beispiel des Kriteriums,” Acta Universitatis Carolinae, Philologica 1-
Graecolatina Pragensia 21 (2006): 63–75 [= idem, Die Züge des Skeptikers. Der dialektische Charakter
von Sextus Empiricus’ Werk (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005): 96– 107].
 See Emidio Spinelli, “Vero. verità, vita. Deficienze epistemologiche e soluzioni pragmatiche?,” Iride
76 (2015): 625–639.
 See, Theodor Ebert, “The Origin of the Stoic Theory of Signs in Sextus Empiricus,” Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy 5 (1987): 83– 126; James Allen, Inference from Signs: Ancient Debates about the Na-
ture of Evidence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001): 87– 146; Pierre Pellegrin, “Scepticisme et sémiologie
médicale,” in De Zénon d’Élée à Poincaré. Recueil d’études en hommage à Roshdi Rashed, eds. Régis
Morelon and Ahmad Hasnawi (Louvain and Paris: Peteers, 2004): 645–664; and Richard Bett, “Le
signe dans la tradition pyrrhonienne,” in Signe et prédiction dans l’antiquité, ed. José Kany-Turpin
(Saint-Étienne: Publications de l’Université de Saint-Etienne, 2005): 29–48.
 See Emidio Spinelli, “Non si dimostra il vero: la critica di Sesto Empirico ai procedimenti apodit-
tici,” Elenchos 36 (2015): 297–316.
 See Spinelli, Questioni scettiche, ch. 3.
 See Emidio Spinelli, “Dialectic and Sophisms: the Sceptical Dissolution of Dogmatic Logic” (forth-
coming).
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2 Logical Division and Its Four Aspects
Sextus’ first target is the concept of division. Before discussing its more questionable
aspects, in PH II 213 Sextus invokes the authority of ‘some dogmatists’ who consid-
ered dialectic ‘the science of deduction, induction, definition and division,’ appa-
rently in an attempt to apply the same scheme to his own exposition. Sextus states
that, in addition to his previous analysis of the notions of criterion, sign, and demon-
strative logoi, he has already discussed syllogisms, inductions, and definitions. He
now deems it appropriate to also examine, however briefly (brachea), the last section
of dialectic: that pertaining to division (PH II 213–228), whose specific weight within
the philosophical tradition embodied by Platonic and Peripatetic philosophers is un-
deniable.⁸
Presumably relying once again on the authority of the dogmatists mentioned at
the beginning (phasi), Sextus presents—and sets out to criticise, what in his view
seems to be easily (rhadion isos)—a distinction between four modes of diairesis,
namely the division:
1. of the name into its relative meanings;
2. of the whole into its parts;
3. of the genus into its species;
4. of the species into individuals.⁹
If we start from the division of the name into its meanings, we will immediately no-
tice an underlying feature of Sextus’ argumentative strategy. The premise on which it
rests in PH II 214 (= fr. 65 Hülser) is the acceptance—and perhaps not just disserendi
 On this aspect, see Benson Mates, The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1996): 285. One should also note that Sextus’ ‘thematic index’—apart
from the inversion of the topic examined: division, definition, induction, and syllogism—corresponds
to the partition attested by Alcinous in his Didaskalikos (III, 153, 30–32 Hermann); cf. Sextus Empiri-
cus, Outlines of Scepticism, trans. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 22000): 126, n. 313, where another passage of the Didaskalikos (156 Hermann), as well as Am-
monius, in Int. 15, 16– 18, are quoted. On some textual difficulties posed by these texts, see Whittak-
er’s cautious observations in Alcinoos. Enseignement des doctrines de Platon, ed. John Whittaker
(Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1990): ad loc., and also Michelangelo Giusta, “Due capitoli sui dossografi
di fisica,” in Storiografia e dossografia nella filosofia antica, ed. Giuseppe Cambiano (Turin: Tirrenia,
1986): 177–178, especially n. 60.
 For a similar scheme of division, see also other sources: for example, Alcinous, Seneca, Galen, and
Alexander of Aphrodisias, as well as Ps.-Gal. Hist. phil. ch. 14 and Clement of Alexandria (on his treat-
ment of the topic, see Riccardo Chiaradonna, “Definitions, Species, Wholes, Parts. Clem. Strom.
VIII.6.19.2–20.2,” forthcoming). On their structure and mutual analogies or differences, apart from
some useful references offered in The So-Called Eighth Stromateus by Clement of Alexandria (Leiden:
Brill, 2016): ad loc. and also by Jonathan Barnes, Porphyry: Introduction (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2003): 339–342, see especially Jaap Mansfeld, Heresiography in Context: Hippolytus’ Elenchos as a
Source for Greek Philosophy (Leiden: Brill, 1992): 80ff. and 125ff., who insists on the comparison be-
tween PH II 219–227 and Ps.-Hyppolitus, ref. VII 16– 18.
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causa, as the formula kai eikotosmight be taken to suggest—of a widely accepted the-
sis in the dogmatist milieu (phasin): true knowledge, namely ‘science’ or episteme, is
something firm and immutable. As such, it falls within the realm of physei entities
and not of conventional products that are likely to undergo sudden changes and
are subject to our judgement, which is to say—as Sextus points out—that it falls with-
in the sphere of what is eph’hemin. May this thesis be traced back, first of all, to a
Platonic Academic philosophical background, one also shared by Aristotle (see espe-
cially An. post. I 33)? The way in which it is presented, particularly the emphasis on
the characteristic of immutability (ametaptotos, which like the following eumetapto-
tos is a hapax in Sextus), does not seem to suggest a Platonic echo and polemical
target,¹⁰ but perhaps allows a further speculation. One might suppose that Sextus
here has a Stoic thesis in mind, a ‘heterodox’ thesis, possibly because it was still
too Socratic in its distinctive traits (see in particular SVF I 413). It might be the radical
thesis upheld by Herillus, who identified telos with a form of science intended as
‘constant disposition.’¹¹
Leaving aside the question of the origin of this doctrine, the mentioning of it al-
lows Sextus to strategically highlight the unscientific nature, or, if we like, the inca-
pacity, of operating on the firm and incontrovertible level of truth of diairetic activity,
which some scholars have taken to amount to a merely lexicographical exercise in
the clarification of homonyms.¹² The semantic function of names is presented as a
merely conventional product by means of arguments that also occur, albeit in rela-
tion to different polemical aims, in other sections of Sextus’ corpus: what we have
is, on the one hand, the reciprocal linguistic incomprehension between Greeks
and barbarians, and, on the other, the arbitrary and ever-changing connection be-
tween names and the things they signify.¹³
 One may however remember the continuous reference to the bebaios character of the so-called
epistemonikos logos, again in Alcinous’ Didaskalikos (see p. 154, 29, 30 Hermann = p. 5 Whittaker).
 See therefore SVF I 409; 411; 414–417 and Anna Maria Ioppolo, “Lo Stoicismo di Erillo,” Phronesis
30 (1985): 58–78 [now in eadem, Dibattiti filosofici ellenistici. Dottrina delle cause, Stoicismo, Accade-
mia scettica, eds. Bruno Centrone, Riccardo Chiaradonna, Diana Quarantotto, and Emidio Spinelli
(Sankt Augustin: Academia, 2013): 119– 135].
 See Mates, The Skeptic Way, 285.
 On the alleged Diodorean origin of this last logos, see Catherine Atherton, The Stoics on Ambiguity
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 430; more generally, on Diodorus Chronus’ theory of
language, see Francesco Verde, Elachista: La dottrina dei minimi nell’Epicureismo (Leuven: Leuven
University Press, 2013): 210 ff. For other passages, in which Sextus insists on forms of linguistic con-
ventionalism, see PH II 256; III 266–268; M XI 239–243; M I 36–38 e 144– 147, as well as some useful
observations in David K. Glidden, “Parrots, Pyrrhonists and Native Speakers,” in Language, ed. Ste-
phen Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994): 129–148; Sextus Empiricus, Contro gli
etici, ed. Emidio Spinelli (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1995): 393–394; Sextus Empiricus, Against the Ethicists
(Adversus Mathematicos XI), ed. Richard Bett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997): 244–248; and Sextus
Empiricus, Against the Grammarians (Adversus Mathematicos I), ed. David L. Blank (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1998): 105–107.
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On the doxographical level too this passage from Sextus offers some interesting
insights: the final demolition of the definition of dialectic as the science of signifiers
and things signified—here recorded in an anonymous form (hos oiontai tines)—can,
and indeed must, be seen to find its remote yet certain origin in Chrysippus (see DL
VII 62).
3 Splitting the Whole into Its Parts
After having demolished the notion of division in a terse and schematic way, in PH II
215–218 Sextus turns his attention to the issue of the relation between the whole and
its parts. In these sections, leaving open the question of the existence or non-exis-
tence of the whole and its parts, Sextus exclusively directs his criticism ‘against
the possibility of dividing a whole into its parts, a topic with which he does not
deal at all in M 9.331–358.’¹⁴ It is undeniable that this general question was very
dear to the philosopher, since he repeatedly examines it, not merely occasionally
in different sections of his works,¹⁵ but also under more specific ‘rubrics,’ such as,
for instance:
1. in the sections devoted to ‘physics,’ as he himself mentions at the beginning of
PH II 215;¹⁶
2. in the technical context of the ‘grammatical’ partition of a logos into its parts (see
M I 132– 141; cf. also M I 162– 168);¹⁷
3. in the context of a more specifically ‘arithmetical’ discussion (see M IV 23–33).
 Katherina Ierodiakonou, “Wholes and Parts: M 9.331–358,” in Sextus Empiricus and Ancient Phys-
ics, eds. Keimpe Algra and Katherina Ierodiakonou (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015):
111.
 See, for example, PH III 45–46 and 85–96; M III 35–36; IX 258–264 and 308–319.
 The closest reference seems to be PH III 98– 101. If this is true (and if therefore one should posit a
coherent plan of composition behind Sextus’ treatment of these topics), it is legitimate to refer not
only to PH III 85–93 but also, on the one hand, to the ‘parallel’ section in M IX 297 ff. and, on the
other, albeit the examples used are not always identical, to the above-mentioned relevant chapters
in M IX 331–358. With regard to the latter, one can usefully read Ierodiakonou, “Wholes and
parts,” and especially the very stimulating analysis in Jonathan Barnes, “Bits and Pieces,” in Matter
and Metaphysics, eds. Jonathan Barnes and Mario Mignucci (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1988): 228, especial-
ly nn. 10– 12. On some questions related to the doxographical (Stoic?) paternity of these Sextan pas-
sages, especially M IX 352, see also Dirk Baltzly, “Who are the mysterious dogmatists of Adversus
Mathematicus ix 352?,” Ancient Philosophy 18 (1998): 145– 170 and the very cautious position adopted
by Ierodiakonou, “Wholes and parts,” 120– 129.
 See the careful commentary by David Blank in Sextus Empiricus, Against the Grammarians, 170–
175, who rightly affirms: ‘the topic of part and whole […] was of capital importance for the dogmatists,
who promised to speak truly about the “all” or “whole,” that is, the universe, and then for the scep-
tics, who needed it as an example of the dogmatists’ rashness’ (ibidem, 170– 171).
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In the passage under scrutiny, Sextus embarks on a general investigation of one of
the possible aspects of diairesis without ever losing sight of his aim: to disprove
the logical devices commonly employed by the dogmatists so as to undermine
their truth claims. Sextus resorts to a numerical example, the number 10 and its
parts,¹⁸ in keeping with a mode of arguing that—as he himself consciously notes—
is typical of the sceptics.¹⁹
The criticism unfolds along two distinct lines:
(a) the impossibility of dividing 10 into its parts;
(b) the impossibility of conceiving the parts within 10 in a non-contradictory way.
a. Let us suppose that we divide 10 into the following parts—1+2+3+4—and,
clearly stretching the argument to some extent, let us consider division to
be almost a synonym of subtraction.²⁰ The first of the divided parts, 1, will
then be subtracted from 10, which will become 9 and hence lose its peculiar-
ity as a whole, and the same applies to the other elements in the division/
subtraction.
b. Given any division of the whole, moreover, its parts must necessarily be en-
compassed by the whole itself.²¹ However, taking once again our chosen nu-
merical example, if 10 is divided into 9+1 and then into 8+2, 7+3, and so on, it
must be admitted that 10 encompasses, in addition to itself, the full sum of
its parts (9+8+7+6+5+4+3+2+1=45). We must therefore grant that ‘10 encom-
passes 45.’
These absurd conclusions—which also apply on the ‘geometric level,’ which is to say
in the case of magnitudes, to be intended however as continuous and not discrete
quantities—²² ought to show that it is impossible to divide a whole into parts.
Faced with this unlikely claim, which seems to run against the most basic rules of
common sense, one could raise some substantial doubts and objections, so as to
highlight its ‘sophistic’ character, so to speak.²³ Sextus himself seems to be aware
of this, since he introduces his polemical logoi with the kind of cautious language
 Is this another implicit yet transparent allusion to the ‘holy’ Pythagorean decade? See Mansfeld,
Heresiography in Context, 170.
 Hos ethos tois apo tes skepseos, as we read in M IX 311; for a possible Platonic antecedent, see
Theaet. 204b-c; see also Barnes, “Bits and Pieces,” 237, n. 27, and Ierodiakonou, “Wholes and
parts,” 115–116.
 See also PH III 85 and Eugen Pappenheim, Erläuterungen zu des Sextus Empiricus pyrrhoneischen
Grundzügen (Leipzig: Meiner, 1881): 147.
 On the meaning and textual distribution/diffusion of the verb emperiechesthai (or even of the sim-
ple periechesthai), see again Barnes, “Bits and Pieces,” 234, n. 21.
 Sextus would here appear to overlook the evident difference between the two thematic fields, a
difference which he himself admits elsewhere; see, for example, M IV 1.
 This ‘sophistic’ spirit has been stressed by many scholars; see, for example, Mates, The Skeptic
Way, 285 and especially Barnes, “Bits and Pieces,” 270 (with additional textual references to Locke
and Leibniz).
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that distinguishes Pyrrhonian formulations: he ‘qualifies’ them using semantically
restrictive phonai (such as tacha, PH II 216, or isos, PH II 218) that are far removed
from the dogmatist exposition of logical and linguistic statements as absolute, incon-
trovertible truths.
4 Genera and Species:
Mental Concepts or Substantial Entities?
Sextus shifts the focus of his attack to a web of notions that carries even greater im-
plications in terms of the claim of possessing the truth in the sections which he de-
votes to an examination of the dogmatist use of genera/species as a pair of terms (PH
II 219–227).²⁴
At the very beginning, in § 219,we find a sort of cross-reference, a crucial element
for anyone wishing to further investigate and better understand Sextus’ overall argu-
ment, as well as the connections which might be seen to lend coherence to his po-
lemical exposition. Sextus writes that he will be returning to the question of the re-
lationship between genera/species in greater detail elsewhere (platyteron men en
allois). However, the philosopher does not keep this important promise, at any
rate judging from his surviving writings.²⁵ We must make do, then, with the succinct
analysis he offers in his Outlines, an analysis that from the very beginning is marked
by the explicit identification of two polemical targets:
(a) A first group of dogmatists maintains that genera and species are merely concep-
tual products. Sextus regards the position of these thinkers—in all likelihood,
Stoics—to have already been refuted through the aporias raised against the gov-
erning part (of the soul, the hegemonikon) and the notion of ‘representation’
(phantasia).²⁶
 For a clear and accurate analysis of these paragraphs, see Mansfeld, Heresiography in Context,
125–131, whose conclusions I shall accept in what follows. For a very peculiar application of the gen-
era/species pair to the notion of genike gramme, seeM III 92 ff., and Wolfgang Freytag,Mathematische
Grundbegriffe bei Sextus Empiricus (Hildesheim: Olms, 1995): 83–95.
 On this point, see Sexti Empirici Opera, recensuit Hermann Mutschmann, vol. I: Πυρρωνεῖων
ὑποτυπώσεων libros tres continens, editionem stereotypam emendatam curavit, addenda et corrigen-
da adjecit Juergen Mau (Leipzig: Teubner, 1958): XXVII; one may however imagine that Sextus exam-
ined that question in one of the lost books antecedent to M VII-XI. For this hypothesis, see especially
Karel Janáček, “Die Hauptschrift des Sextus Empiricus als Torso erhalten?,” Philologus 107
(1963): 271–277 [now in idem, Studien zu Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius und zur pyrrhonischen
Skepsis, eds. Jan Janda and Filip Karfík (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 2008): 124– 131] and Jerker
Blomqvist, “Die Skeptika des Sextus Empiricus,” Grazer Beiträge 2 (1974): 12–24, as well as Mansfeld,
Heresiography in Context, 130, who suggests that Ps-Hyppolitus too might depend on the same, more
detailed Sextan passage.
 See PH II 70–71. The Stoic origin of the theses attacked here seems to be confirmed by the pres-
ence of some very technical terms belonging to their lexicon. This notwithstanding, PH II 219 is ab-
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(b) A second group of philosophers instead grants genera and species self-subsis-
tence (idia hypostasis). Based on cross-references with texts by Seneca, Alcinous,
and Clement of Alexandria, it has been reasonably suggested that this ‘second
group consists of Middle Platonists (that is to say, inclusive of the Middle Platon-
ist Plato and the Aristoteles interpretatus).’²⁷
The theses upheld by this second group of opponents may have struck Sextus as
being more challenging or better argued, since he does not limit himself to providing
a swift, terse refutation, but examines them in greater detail in PH II 220–222. Given
the actual existence of genera (disserendi causa, of course), it thus seems as though
those wishing to highlight their limits are faced with two possibilities:
(a) there are as many genera as species;
(b) there is only one genus, common to all the species that fall under it.
The first alternative forces us to deny the very possibility of a diairesis of the genus,
i.e., of that process enabling us to acknowledge a multiplicity of species to be sub-
sumed under the single and same genos. The second alternative, instead, entails a
series of contradictions; in fact, it presupposes the creation of some real fictions (ei-
dolopoieseis, PH II 222: a noun that constitutes a hapax in Sextus). In order to expose
these contradictions, Sextus sets out to reveal certain dogmatic incongruities through
a range of objections that carry considerable weight within the Pyrrhonian polemical
arsenal and whose presence in this section of the corpus is certainly noteworthy.²⁸ At
this point, one might also speculate: can Sextus’ formulation find an authoritative
precedent in Plato’s Parmenides (see especially Parm. 131a ff.)? Or, at least, may it
constitute a conscious counterpart to some sort of Middle Platonist reading of
these Platonic pages?²⁹
The richness of the possible philosophical background of Sextus’ objections and
the objective strength they display in their attempt to demolish two cornerstones of
the much-flaunted dogmatist ability to build cogent arguments, as far as the identi-
fication of the truth is concerned, suggest that we should examine the development
of Sextus’ polemic more closely. Sextus’ criticism revolves around two key points:
sent from SVF and also from Hülser’s collection; see Mansfeld, Heresiography in Context, 126, n. 50.
The term ennoema, attested only here and in M IX 355–356, would also appear to be Stoic; see DLVII
60.
 Mansfeld, Heresiography in Context, 126.
 In PH II 222, these Pyrrhonian logoi are labelled as skeptikai ephodoi, a formula used also in PH II
258, on which, see Theodor Ebert, Dialektiker und frühe Stoiker bei Sextus Empiricus. Untersuchungen
zur Entstehung der Aussagenlogik (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991): 256–257, n. 22 and Fer-
nanda Decleva Caizzi, “Sesto e gli scettici,” Elenchos 13 (1992): 296, n. 41 (now also online: http://
scholarlysource.daphnet.org/index.php/DDL/article/view/130). For similar objections, see also PH
III 158 ff.
 See, for example, Alcinous, Didask.VI 159, 35 H. and Mansfeld, Heresiography in Context, 126– 127;
Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, 128, n. 323, referring back to PH III 158– 162.
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1. Not every species can participate in the whole genus, because otherwise it would
exhaust that genus in itself, so to speak, and hence it could not be ‘participated’
in by any other species.
2. Not every species can participate even in a part of the genus, for at least for two
reasons:
a. Because if it did, we would not find the whole genus in the species and
would have to say, for example, that man is only substance, and not the
other parts of the ‘animal’ genus (for example, animated or endowed with
sensation);
b. Because not every species participates in the same part of the genus (for this
would give rise to the same difficulties encountered under point 1), nor do
different species participate in different parts. In the latter case, ‘they will
either be generically different, which conflicts with the notion of a common
genus, or each genus will become infinite, being divided not only into entire-
ly different species but also into entirely different empirical individuals.’³⁰
With no scruples about doxographical homogeneity, and with little concern about
switching from one dogmatist family to another in his polemic, Sextus seems to
shift from a remote Platonist or Middle Platonist terrain³¹ to one of his favourite tar-
gets. From PH II 223 (= fr. 718 Hülser), his polemical focus is yet another doctrine typ-
ical of the Stoics. The latter identify (phasin) ‘something’ (ti) as the supreme genus
(see PH II 86). Purely by way of hypothesis and for the sake of argumentative com-
pleteness (logou eneken), Sextus puts forward three alternatives. This supreme cate-
gory, the ti, is:
(a) all things;
(b) only some things;
(c) no things.
Alternative (c) is immediately discarded, since it is tantamount to positing that the
supreme genus is nothing at all. Hypothesis (a) also raises some glaring contradic-
tions,³² for if the supreme genus is both corporeal/incorporeal, true/false, white/
black, and so on, then the species and individuals ‘in which it is found’ also
 Ibidem, 126 and n. 53, where Sextus’ correct form of argumentation is explicitly praised.
 Although one should not forget the Platonic ‘adoption,’ in Severus, of the Stoic doctrine of the ti;
see also David Sedley, Stoic Metaphysics at Rome, inMetaphysics, Soul, and Ethics in Ancient Thought:
Themes From the Work of Richard Sorabji, ed. Ricardo Salles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005):
117– 142.
 The example used here (§ 224: the animal as ‘an animate sensitive substance’) seems to be a stan-
dard, quasi-‘scholastic’ definition, possibly a ‘common asset’ of the Platonic, Peripatetic, and Stoic
traditions at the time; see Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, 120.
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ought to be such,³³ a conclusion obviously in contrast with reality. Finally, alternative
(b) suggests that we can only identify the ti with, for example, the body or with ra-
tionality, which automatically implies the non-existence of ‘something’ incorporeal
or non-rational (conclusions that openly conflict with established Stoic theses).
Faithful to his ‘diabolically ecumenical’ intention to spare no possible commen-
tator who makes a dogmatic claim of possessing the truth, Sextus takes a sort of ex-
egetical turn at the end of PH II 225 by focusing on the further dogmatist attempt to
describe the genus as something that is all things in potency (dynamei) but not in act:
an attempt that has a Peripatetic ‘flavour’ to it and carries markedly polemical impli-
cations.³⁴ Once again, this dogmatist suggestion, anchored in the dialectical relation
between potency and act, proves fruitless in Sextus’ eyes. He plays with basic con-
cepts that are well established in the philosophies he attacks, since he ‘jumps
from the relative to the absolute sense of “not being.”’³⁵ For Sextus, the dogmatist
(or possibly Peripatetic) is first of all forced to define what the genus itself is in
act; yet as soon as he does so, he finds himself caught in the aporias already exam-
ined with regard to the aforementioned alternative (a), and hence is forced to aban-
don his hypothetical yet fragile way out.
In this progressive accumulation of polemical targets, attacked in relation to the
alleged explicative or heuristic strength of the genos, there is another dogmatist
short-cut which does not escape Sextus’ attention: the thesis that the genus coin-
cides with some things in act and others only in potency. For example, if the ti is ‘ac-
tually’ (energeia) corporeal, it cannot be dynamei incorporeal. Sextus’ argument here
proves particularly effective, insofar as it denies that the genus encompasses, at least
potentially, the different qualities, or even opposite or contradictory qualities (white/
black, true/false, etc.), of its species. The argument can apparently be applied to any
opponent seeking to uphold this thesis.³⁶
Sextus’ last objection, put forward in PH II 227, concerns a well-known example
that was no doubt widely used in dogmatist milieus. It revolves around the impossi-
bility of regarding the word ‘man’ as being truly and unqualifiedly common to all the
particular entities that ought to fall within it. Let us grant that statements such as
‘Alexander is taking a walk’ and ‘Paris is taking a walk’ are both either true or
false, since the proper nouns used are absolutely homonymous. This is not the
case when the subject of a statement is a common noun, as this would give a linguis-
tic character to its genus. In his example, Sextus seems to be mocking the discus-
sions and dialectical arguments typical of his opponents’ schools. If we say ‘a
man is taking a walk,’ we must grant that this proposition is not always true or al-
 On this distinctive Sextan interpretation of the relationship between genera/species and individ-
uals and for some parallels in Plotinus, see again ibidem, 127, n. 55.
 See Long, “Sextus Empiricus on the Criterion of Truth,” 48, n. 25.
 Mansfeld, Heresiography in Context, 129.
 As is later the case with Porphyry; see Isag. 10. 22– 11–6.
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ways false, but rather true in the case of Theon, who is indeed taking a walk, and
false in the case of Dion, who is seated.
In this case too, then, Sextus’ polemic combines notions more specifically relat-
ed to the field of logic with what characterises the linguistic expressions exploited by
the various dogmatist schools. The latter—judging at least from Sextus’ cumulative
and far from neutral reconstruction—all share an obstinate desire to assign our as-
sertions an ontologically cogent value on the semantic level.
5 Common Accidents or Private Properties?
The set of criticisms advanced against the background of this complex logical, lin-
guistic, and conceptual network culminates in PH II 228 with an attempt to disprove
the notion of common accidents. Moving directly on from the objections examined in
the previous sections, Sextus extends his criticism to those qualifications that seem
to be transversally ‘promiscuous,’ which is to say common to several entities, when
in fact in each case they turn out to apply only to one subject (the adjective used
here, idion, may be an allusion to Stoic doctrine)—or, to be more precise, to a partic-
ular condition or situation in which the entity in question finds itself, as though
these qualifications were an integral part of a sort of metaphysical principium indi-
viduationis.³⁷ The examples of symbebekota chosen by Sextus (sight and breathing)
show that the apparently common predicability with respect to Dion or Theon, for
instance, no longer applies the moment one of the two subjects radically changes
his status. Sight and breathing ‘perish,’ so to speak, with the death of the subject
in relation to whom they were enunciated; nor is it reasonable to suppose that
they endure as self-subsistent entities.
6 Beyond Theory, but Towards Life …
Retracing the steps of Sextus’ attack on the various notions examined in certain sec-
tions of the second book of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism—often schematic or even in-
adequate steps, at times compelling or cogent ones—has proven to be a rather useful
exercise in two respects. On the one hand, the analysis of Sextus carried out in these
pages and the sharp pars destruens they deliver have enabled us—with obvious ben-
efits on the doxographical level—to highlight some of the argumentative tools, or at
any rate some of the main points of reference, in the reasoning developed by individ-
 The way in which Sextus here examines and solves the problem seems to justify the conclusion
that ‘the present section is very Leibnizian,’ see Mates, The Skeptic Way, 286. The difficult question of
a reliable principium individuationis was at any rate also a crucial topic for ancient medicine; see
therefore Riccardo Chiaradonna, “Universals in Ancient Medicine,” in Universals in Ancient Philoso-
phy, eds. Riccardo Chiaradonna and Gabriele Galluzzo (Pisa: Edizioni dela Normale, 2013): 381–423.
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ual dogmatist currents. Each of these currents sought to consolidate its solid know-
ledge, its established episteme, as the unquestionable province of truth. On the other
hand, behind Sextus’ persistent arguments it has been possible to grasp a fully and
distinctly Pyrrhonian pars construens: the progressive demolition of the cornerstones
of the logical structure of dogmatism enables the true sceptic to fully exercise his
most genuine dynamis. In PH I 8, this is praised as a crucial sceptical
ability to set out oppositions among things which appear and are thought of in any way at all, an
ability by which, because of the equipollence in the opposed objects and accounts,we come first
to suspension of judgement and afterwards to tranquillity.³⁸
This intellectual effort does away with all truth claims and, ultimately, probably re-
jects even the alleged primacy of the bios theoretikos.³⁹ In his critical enquiry, the Pyr-
rhonian philosopher does not investigate conflicting dogmatist theses on the level of
the strict rules of Aristotelian logic, i.e., in the light of the alleged mutually exclusive
contradictory status between what is absolutely true and what is absolutely false.⁴⁰
Rather, he bases the assessment of these theses on their credibility, which is psycho-
logically experienced as being equipollent and hence capable of leading to a morally
fruitful suspension of judgement.⁴¹ With this comes something capable of providing
guidance in the complexity of everyday life, namely the acceptance of a series of ap-
parent values and phenomena that prove pragmatically effective insofar as they are
governed by the non-dogmatic four-fold rule for directing one’s mind. Sextus sums it
up as follows (PH I 23):
Thus, attending to what is apparent, we live in accordance with everyday observances, without
holding opinions—for we are not able to be utterly inactive. These everyday observances seem to
be fourfold, and to consist in guidance by nature, necessitation by feelings, handing down of
laws and customs, and teaching of kinds of expertise.⁴²
In other words, if it is true that we can do without the truth, it will be useful to gaze
at reality with different eyes, with a less presumptuously definitive or absolute per-
 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, 4.
 For more details, see Emidio Spinelli, “Beyond the Theoretikos Bios: Philosophy and Praxis in
Sextus Empiricus,” in Theoria, Praxis, and the Contemplative Life after Plato and Aristotle, eds. Tho-
mas Bénatouïl and Mauro Bonazzi (Leiden: Brill, 2012): 101– 117.
 In this case too, let me refer back to Emidio Spinelli, “Sextus Empiricus et l’ombre longue d’Ari-
stote,” Philosophie Antique 12 (2012): 275–277.
 I focus on some crucial aspects related to the sceptical notion of epoche in Emidio Spinelli, “Sesto
Empirico: iceberg scettico della nozione di ἐποχή,” Archivio di Filosofia 83 (2015): 193–207. On the
notion of equipollence, see also Diego Machuca, “Argumentative Persuasiveness in Ancient Pyrrhon-
ism,” Méthexis 22 (2009): 101– 126 and Svavar H. Svavarsson, “Sextus Empiricus on Persuasiveness
and Equipollence,” in Strategies of Argument. Essays in Ancient Ethics, Epistemology, and Logic, ed.
Mi-Kyoung Lee (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014): 356–373.
 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, 9.
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spective. We can then shape our being in the world in the light of different criteria,
criteria that may be weaker and less appealing perhaps, but are no less fruitful: pri-
mum vivere, deinde philosophari […].⁴³
 In conclusion, let me warmly thank Riccardo Chiaradonna and Francesco Verde, who offered use-
ful comments on a first draft of this paper.
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